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Abstract
We examine the historical determinants of differences in preferences for work across so-
cieties today. Our hypothesis is that a society’s work ethic depends on the role that labor
has played in it historically, as an input in agricultural production: societies that have for
centuries depended on the cultivation of crops with high returns to labor effort will work
longer hours and develop a preference for working hard. We formalize this prediction in
the context of a model of endogenous preference formation, with altruistic parents that
can invest in reducing their offsprings’ disutility from work. To empirically found our
model, we construct an index of potential agricultural labor intensity, that captures the
suitability of a location for the cultivation of crops with high estimated returns to labor
in their production. We find that this index positively predicts work hours and attitudes
towards work in contemporary European regions. We find support for the hypothesis of
cultural transmission, by examining the correlation between potential labor intensity in
the parents’ country of origin and hours worked by children of European immigrants in
the US.
JEL Classification: J22, J24, N30, N50, Z13
Keywords: Agriculture, Labor Productivity, Hours of Work, Culture
∗We thank Alberto Alesina, Jeanet Bentzen, Davide Cantoni, Pedro Forquesato, Oded Galor, Stelios
Michalopoulos, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson, Tetyana Surovtseva, Felipe Valencia, Hans-Joachim Voth, Yanos
Zylberberg and participants in the 7th End-of-Year Conference of Swiss Economists Abroad, the Brown Uni-
versity Macro Lunch, the 2014 European Meeting of the Econometric Society at Toulouse and the Economic
History Seminar at UC Davis for helpful comments and suggestions.
†Stanford University. Email: vfouka@stanford.edu
‡Stanford University. Email: alainsch@stanford.edu
1
1 Introduction
Attitudes towards work have been connected to economic development since Max Weber’s
famous thesis on the Protestant work ethic and the rise of capitalism. Changing work
patterns (de Vries, 1994; Voth, 1998) and an increasing importance placed on the values of
hard work and diligence (Anthony, 1977) marked the passage from a peasant society to
industrialization in England, while the Confucian work ethic has been credited with part
of the success of the East Asian “miracle” economies (Liang, 2010). Today, attitudes toward
work and leisure vary widely across countries, with the divide between the US and Europe
being the most well known example of this variation (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2006).
Though one can see how hard-working individuals and societies might end up doing well,
the origin of such values is not obvious, since work also entails disutility. In fact, for some
authors, the question is “not why people are lazy or why they goof off but why, in absence
of compulsion, they work hard” (Lipset, 1992). This study suggests that a norm of hard
work develops when returns to work outweigh its costs. In particular, we examine the
hypothesis that a work ethic forms when labor constitutes a relatively profitable input in
the production process.
Studies in evolutionary anthropology suggest that attitudes are shaped as part of the in-
teraction of humans with their environment and that cultural norms that have been proven
useful will be selected and transmitted more successfuly than others, through both verti-
cal and horizontal socialization (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). A relatively recent literature
in economics has used these insights to show how preferences can be endogenously cho-
sen and transmitted from parents to offspring in response to the environment (Bisin and
Verdier, 2001; Tabellini, 2008; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008).1 A number of empirical studies
have shown that geography and the mode of production has an impact on diverse aspects of
culture, including cooperative behavior (Henrich et al., 2001), trust (Durante, 2010), gender
norms (Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013), time preferences (Galor and Ozak, forthcom-
ing), and cognitive patterns (Talhelm et al., 2014).
1For empirical evidence on this intergenerational transmission process see, for example, Dohmen et al.
(2012).
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Our study builds on these ideas and develops a theory of how a preference for work
can arise and persist in societies in which labor has high returns in production. We look for
the origins of work ethic in the pre-industrial agricultural production structure of modern
economies, both because agriculture was the main mode of production in human societies
for a very long time, and also because it continues to play an important role in many
developing countries today. Our main hypothesis is that high returns to labor effort in agri-
cultural production, or, alternatively, a high agricultural labor intensity, should provide an
incentive for investment in a preference for work. Other things equal, societies cultivating
crops more dependent on labor effort, will have to provide a higher labor input in equilib-
rium. Since a larger share of the total output depends on the provision of labor, norms that
reduce the disutility of labor will be useful in these societies, and will prevail, just as the an-
thropological literature suggests. Such norms can then persist and be perpetuated through
socialization mechanisms. As in models of cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2000,
2001), altruistic parents who care about their children’s utility, will invest more in their
offsprings’ preference for work when their future income relies more on it.
Equilibrium utilization of labor in agriculture depends on many things, including the
availability of capital or other production factors, the production technology and environ-
mental conditions. Nevertheless, when we hold the rest of these factors constant, different
crops are produced through different cultivation processes and impose “technological con-
straints” determining the marginal product of labor for given factor input ratios. Rice is
perhaps the most notable example of a labor intensive crop (Bray, 1986). A number of
studies document its higher requirement of labor input in equilibrium, as demonstrated
by the choices of farmers who cultivate rice alongside other crops. Esther Boserup records
that farmers in India allocate 125 work days per hectare for wet paddy rice, while only
33-47 days per hectare for dry wheat (Boserup, 1965). Similar observations in contempo-
rary China show that farmers spent 12-25 days of work per mu (approx. 0.165 acres) of
rice versus 4-10 days of work per mu of wheat (Bell, 1992). These studies are supported
in their conclusions by studies from environmental scientists. Ruthenberg (1976) notes that
marginal returns to labor in wheat production are “lower and decrease more rapidly with
greater employment of labor” when compared with rice production.
The laborious nature of rice cultivation has been theorized to have an impact on the
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work ethic of those societies that have historically depended on this crop for sustenance
(Davidson, 2009). “If man works hard the land will not be lazy”, is a Chinese proverb that
illustrates the popular understanding of the connection between hard work and potential
agricultural returns (Arkush, 1984). In popularized social science writings the connection
is sometimes drawn between the high academic achievement of Asian students and their
industriousness, shaped by the “tradition of wet-rice agriculture and meaningful work”
(Gladwell, 2008).
In this study, we test the intuition that agricultural labor intensity leads to a culture of
high work values in a systematic way. We start by showing theoretically that high marginal
returns in agricultural production will endogenously lower the disutility from work, when
altruistic parents can invest in their offsprings’ work preferences. We then take this pre-
diction to the data. The first step in this process is to obtain an estimate of how labor
intensive is the production of different crops under conditions of traditional and largely
non-mechanized agriculture. We use data from the 1886 Prussian agricultural census, which
is, to our knowledge, one of the oldest available censuses containing yield information dis-
aggregated by crop. Assuming optimizing behavior on the part of farmers, we structurally
back out the share of labor relative to land in each crop’s production. This provides us with
an implicit ranking of crops in terms of labor intensity. We then combine this ranking with
data on soil and climate suitability for each crop from FAO, in order to create a composite
measure of “potential” labor intensity. Our measure is in practice a weighted average of
relative suitabilities for different crops, where the weights are the crops’ estimated labor
intensities, and it is meant to capture the likelihood that agricultural production in an area
will be on average more dependent on labor.
We then show that this measure of potential labor intensity predicts work hours and
attitudes towards work in European regions today. Using data from the European Social
Survey, we find that a higher potential labor intensity leads to a higher number of actual and
desired weekly work hours, as well as to a higher difference between actual and contracted
work hours, controlling for country fixed effects and a number of individual and regional
controls. These results do not depend on the specific Prussian data we use to compute
the labor intensity of different crops. We obtain similar rankings of crops in terms of
labor requirements and similar results using data from the US Census of Agriculture and
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agronomic measures of crop-specific man hours per acre. Furthermore, our measure of
labor intensity only has predictive power for work-related outcomes and attitudes, but not
for other measures of values or beliefs.
We provide evidence that part of the persistent effect of labor intensity on work attitudes
is through cultural transmission. Our estimates get larger in magnitude when we exclude
from our sample first and second generation immigrants, whose culture has been shaped
by historical conditions in the region of their ancestors and not of their current home.
Conversely, when looking at the children of European immigrants in the US, who carry
different cultures but face a similar institutional environment, we find that potential labor
intensity in their parents’ country of origin has a significant and positive effect on the
number of hours they work weekly.
Our study contributes to two growing strands of literature. One broadly examines the
long-run impact of geography on economic and political development (Diamond, 1999;
Michalopoulos, 2012; Haber, 2012; Mayshar et al., 2015). The other one focuses specifically
on the historical determinants of culture. Similarly to Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013)
and Galor and Ozak (forthcoming), we emphasize the role played in the formation of norms
and preferences by historical long-lasting production processes. Other studies stressing the
role of history for the formation of culture are Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2013), who
show that Italian cities with a past of self-governance have higher levels of social capital
today, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who demostrate that trust levels in Africa today can
be explained by historical exposure to the slave trade, and Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012)
who find that anti-semitic attitudes persist at the city-level in Germany over more than 800
years.2
Most empirical studies investigating the determinants of work norms have focused
on the role of Protestantism, in an attempt to test part of the original Weber hypothesis.
Spenkuch (2011) uses data from the German Socio-Economic panel to show that historical
2Becker et al. (2015) document the persistent effects of being part of the Habsburg empire on attitudes
towards the state, while Grosjean (2011) finds empirical support for the persistence of a culture of honor in
the US South dating back to settlement of the area by Scots-Irish immigrants in the late 18th century. More
recently, Becker, Enke and Falk (2016) show that the global distribution of risk, time and social preferences has
been partly determined by the migratory movements of humans out of Africa in the very distant past.
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adoption of protestantism in German precincts affects work hours and earnings of individ-
uals today. Bru¨gger, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) find significant differences in attitudes
towards unemployment in the two sides of the border dividing Protestants from Catholics
in Switzerland. Andersen et al. (2012) find that the historical presence of Cistercian monas-
teries, that pre-dated Protestantism, but were characterized by similar values of hard work
and thrift, affects work attitudes in England today.
Various papers have treated theoretically the transmission of values for work and leisure
(Bisin and Verdier (2001), Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), Doepke and Zilibotti (2008)). The
only study we are aware of that in any way deals with the effects of labor intensity in agri-
cultural production is Vollrath (2011). This paper finds that labor intensive pre-industrial
agriculture can stall industrialization, since it causes a larger share of the population to be
employed in agriculture and lowers output per capita. Using relative suitabilities for wheat
versus rice, the paper establishes this correlation in cross-country data. Our study suggests
an alternative path through which labor intensity can affect industrialization, when pref-
erences are endogenous. When work norms are generally strong, the incentive for capital
accumulation is more pronounced, as, for any given level of capital, more labor will imply
a higher marginal return from its use. This can in fact lead to more capital accumulation in
labor intensive hard-working societies, once an industrial sector has been introduced.3
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a simple model of endogenous
preferences, in which a high agricultural labor intensity leads to a higher work ethic. Section
3 explains the construction of our measure of potential labor intensity. In sections 4 and 5 we
test our main hypothesis with European survey data and demonstrate the robustness of our
results to different measures of labor intensity and work attitudes and to falsification tests.
In section 6 we provide evidence for the cultural transmission of work attitudes. Section 7
discusses limitations and possible extensions of our study and section 8 concludes.
3Confucian values, which place an important weight on hard work and discipline, are thought by many
scholars to contribute the cultural basis for the recent “miracle” growth of — labor-intensive, traditionally
rice-growing — East Asian economies, much in the same way that the Protestant work ethic led to the rise of
capitalism in the West (Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Chan, 1996; Liang, 2010).
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2 A model of work ethic formation
In this section, we formalize how the structure of production can contribute to the long run
formation of a work ethic. In our model, work constitutes a burden on an individual’s wel-
fare, but parents can, through a costly investment, shape the preferences of their offspring
to reduce the adverse utility impact of hours worked. We refer to preferences under which
the disutility effect of work is small, i.e. when individuals are more tolerant towards work,
as representing a high work ethic. The value of having such a tolerance towards hard work
is increasing in the actual number of hours that an individual will end up working.
We assume that adults receive instantaneous utility depending on consumption and
hours worked of the form U(c, h;γ) with Uc ≥ 0, Ucc < 0, Uh < 0, Uhh ≤ 0, Uch = Ucγ = 0,
and Uhγ > 0.4 Thus γ can be thought of as a preference parameter that moderates the
adverse effects of hours worked. This work ethic is formed through a parental transmission
mechanism similar to Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), with a law of motion given by
γ′ = ργ+Ψ(I) (1)
with Ψ(0) = 0,ΨI > 0,ΨI I < 0, where I represents the investment costs of parents (in utility
terms) in their offspring’s work ethic. Individuals live for two periods, one as a child and
one as a parent, and work and consume only in the latter. Parents are assumed to be fully
altruistic with respect to the welfare their offspring receive as adults, which they discount
at a time discount factor δ. A parent then solves the dynamic program
V(γ) = max
c,h,I
{
U(c, h;γ)− I + δV(γ′)}
subject to the law of motion (1) and a resource constraint c ≤ F(h; T, β), where T is a fixed
endowment of land, Fh > 0, Fhh < 0 and Fhβ > 0. Parameter β thus determines how
quickly returns to labor diminish in the production activity, and is thought to be a funda-
mental component of the production function. Optimal choices over work, consumption
4We also assume that the utility function satisfies the Inada type conditions limc→∞Uc = 0 and limc→0 Uc =
∞.
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and investment into offspring then require that
Uc(c∗, h∗;γ)Fh(h∗; T, β) = −Uh(c∗, h∗;γ) (2)
1 = δVγ(γ′)ΨI(I∗) (3)
Vγ(γ) = Uγ(c∗, h∗;γ) + δρVγ(γ′) (4)
As is intuitive, an individual with a larger work ethic parameter γ will choose to work
more hours, a relationship that follows directly from (2). Notice that a higher γ reduces
disutility from labor, thus decreasing the right hand side of (2). In response, optimal hours
worked (and consequently consumption) adjust upwards. The first order conditions have
three further important implications. First, and again following from (2), a higher value of β
leads to an increase in optimal hours worked. A larger β implies a higher marginal product
of labor for given input levels, and as a consequence marginal benefits and costs of hours
worked are equated at a higher work level. Second, the value of having a high work ethic
(a high inherited value of γ) is increasing in the optimal amount of hours worked. This
follows from the envelope condition (4) and the fact that Uγ is increasing in h∗, and makes
intuitive sense: it is particularly beneficial to be tolerant of hard work, if the environment
requires one to work many hours. Finally, parents invest more in the formation of the work
ethic of their child if they expect it to be of high value, as can be seen in (3). Taken together,
the optimality conditions show that parents will invest in their offspring’s work preferences
if they expect their child to work many hours. Hours worked in turn will be high if, among
other factors, the local mode of production is characterized by slowly deceasing returns to
labor, i.e. if β is high.
To analytically solve for the model’s steady state, we specify the functional form of
utility and of the production function as
U(.) = log(c)− 1
γ
h1+φ
1 + φ
(5)
c = AT1−βhβ (6)
so that the consumption good is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function in
land and labor, where A represents total factor productivity. From (2), we then get that
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equilibrium labor supply is given by
h∗ = (βγ)
1
1+φ
and thus increasing in both γ and β. This model has a unique steady state, i.e. a unique
level of γ such that work ethics are constant across generations, determined by
γss =
Ψ(Iss)
1− ρ (7)
1 =
δ
1− δρ
1− ρ
Ψ(Iss)
β
1 + φ
ΨI(Iss) (8)
Notice that the right hand side of (8) is decreasing in Iss, which implies that steady state
parental investment is increasing in β, as already reasoned from the first order conditions.
It then follows directly from (7) that the work ethic is an increasing function of β. This
model thus predicts the formation of a strong work ethic there where marginal returns to
labor are high, for given levels of available land and total productivity.
While this model is kept very parsimonious for purposes of exposition, we discuss ex-
tended versions in the appendix to address two potential sources of concern. We first intro-
duce an endogenous fertility choice, to investigate whether Malthusian population growth
may counteract the development of a high work ethic in a labor intensive environment.
We show that while the relationship between labor intensity and steady state population
size is ambiguous, its effect on work ethics remains strictly positive. Intuitively, the first
result comes from the fact that in an economy with high labor intensity, the possibility of
the parent to invest in a valuable work ethic introduces a quality versus quantity trade-off,
potentially reducing the optimal number of children.
We further study the case of subsistence agriculture by introducing a minimum con-
sumption requirement. Whether this constraint is binding is an endogenous outcome in
our model. In the region where the constraint binds, labor productivity becomes a cru-
cial determinant of attitudes towards work. We derive the conditions under which labor
intensity, as measured by β, continues to positively affect work ethics in subsistence agri-
culture. These conditions are more likely to hold as the economy moves closer to leaving
the constrained area, and are essentially the same as in Vollrath (2011). To deal with the po-
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tential confounding effect of productivity when the subsistence consumption level is barely
reached, we will control for the overall suitability for rainfed agriculture in our estimations.
We conclude this section with a note on our choice of conceptual framework. We have
modeled the formation of a work ethic as the result of the intergenerational transmission
of preferences from parents to children. This transmission happens partly “automatically”
(e.g. via the genetic intergenerational correlation of preferences) and partly via parental in-
vestment. Such a framework is well supported by micro-level empirical evidence (Dohmen
et al., 2012), even though it is hard to disentangle empirically the relative importance of
socialization as opposed to other intergenerational transmission mechanisms, like genetic
transmission. An alternative, and, in our case, complementary mechanism is evolutionary
in nature (Bowles, 1998; Galor and Michalopoulos, 2012): in places where returns to labor in
agricultural production are high, individuals with a high work ethic will be economically
more successful and will, as a result, also enjoy higher reproductive success. Adding to
this a feedback mechanism, whereby those with high work ethic are more likely to adopt
crops with high returns to labor (Galor and Ozak, forthcoming), would only strengthen the
observed correlation between labor intensity and low disutility of work.
3 Measuring returns to labor
The main challenge in empirically testing the relation between agricultural returns to labor
and work ethics lies in the measurement of labor returns. Societies with similar production
modes and comparable productivity potentials will differ in how much labor they utilize
relative to other factors depending on the nature of the main crops they cultivate. As
several studies indicate, wheat and other cereals demand a lower labor to land ratio than
rice (Boserup, 1965; Ruthenberg, 1976; Bell, 1992). This ranking in terms of labor intensity
can presumably be generalized to include all important staple crops.
Agronomic studies often offer estimates of labor requirements in agricultural produc-
tion. Unfortunately, few studies do so systematically for different crops, and those who
do are focused on contemporary mechanized agriculture, usually in the US (Cooper, 1916;
Wakeman Lenhart, 1945). FAO’s Ecocrop database is the closest to a systematic survey of
the characteristics of various crops under different production modes. Though labor inten-
10
sity is included in the recorded characteristics of crops in Ecocrop, its values are missing for
most crops, with non-missing entries for only 3 out of the 15 most important staple crops
wordwide.5
In order to obtain a more detailed and systematic ranking of crops in terms of labor
intensity, we follow a procedure similar to the one suggested by FAO (Lee and Zepeda, 2001)
for gauging the crop-specific marginal returns of various inputs in agricultural production.
We describe a simplified version of this procedure below.
To derive the crop-specific equilibrium share of labor, we need to make some minimal
assumptions on the behavior of farmers and the form of agricultural production. In partic-
ular, we assume that farmers efficiently use their resources and allocate their available land
to different crops so as to equalize marginal returns to land.6 This implies the additional
assumption that land, at least at the margin, is not crop-specific, namely that all crops from
the farmer’s available crop set can potentially grow on the same land. Finally, we consider
a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale in land and labor.7 We
can then write the profit maximization problem of a representative farmer in region j as
max
Hi,j,Ti,j
i
∑
(
Pi,jYi,j − rjTi,j − wjHi,j
)
where Pi,j is the market price of crop i in region j, Yi,j is the output of crop i with Yi,j =
Ai,jT
1−βi
i,j H
βi
i,j , and Ti,j and Hi,j are usage of land and labor with respective region specific
prices rj and wj. Finally, βi represents the crop specific labor intensity of production.
Efficient usage of land by the farmer implies the following first order condition resulting
from the above optimization problem
5According to this classification, wetland rice is a high labor intensity crop, while barley and rye is a low
labor intensity one.
6In other words, farmers behave as profit maximizers, though, if we substitute crop-specific prices with
calories, we can also think of them as maximizing agricultural surplus in calorie terms. The problem set-up in
terms of profits also assumes that markets of both agricultural inputs and output are competitive.
7For the moment, we abstract from capital. To the extent that its use is negligible or does not differ across
crops, this simplification will not be important for our results, and is often assumed by studies estimating
factor shares in traditional agriculture (see for example, Wilde (2013)), including Kopsidis and Wolf (2012),
who estimate agricultural productivity in Prussia using census data. In theory, we can include capital — or
any number of crop-specific inputs — in the production function, so long as we have data on their use. The
problem in practice is that almost no agricultural census, contemporary or historical, includes information on
crop-specific use of machinery or animals.
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(1− βi)
Pi,jYi,j
Ti,j
= rj
Reshuffling terms and taking logs this relation becomes
log(Pi,jYi,j) = log(rj)− log(1− βi) + log(Ti,j) (9)
which can be estimated with data on crop values and on land allocated to the cultivation
of different crops. This is information available in most contemporary agricultural censuses.
Notice that log(1 − βi) is the share of land in the production of crop i, a crop-specific
characteristic that can be empirically captured by a crop fixed effect. log(rj) is the region-
specific price of land, which is in turn captured by a regional fixed effect. The regression
form of (9) then becomes
log(Pi,jYi,j) = γj + δi + α log(Ti,j)
Using the estimates of the crop fixed effects δi, it is then straightforward to back out the
share of labor βi, since from the structural model δi = − log(1− βi). In practice, since one
of the crop fixed effects will be dropped in the estimation, we express the labor shares of
the rest relative to that numeraire.
We estimate the above equation using data from the 1886 Prussian agricultural census,
the earliest historical census that we are aware of which provides information on crop-
specific yields per unit of land harvested for a number of food crops. The census was
conducted by the Royal Prussian Statistical Office and it has been digitized and made avail-
able as part of the ifo Prussian Economic History Database (Becker et al., 2014). We have
data on total output and output per hectare for wheat, barley, rye, oats, potato, field bean
and pea for 518 Prussian counties (Kreise).8 We combine this with price information from
the same year collected by the Prussian Statistical Office. Price information is not available
at the county level, so our estimation rests on the assumption that agricultural output prices
8We average winter and summer harvests of wheat, rye and barley, and add up grain and straw to get to the
final output in kilograms.
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are equalized across Prussia. Normalizing the labor share of wheat to equal 0.4, we derive
estimates for the labor shares of the remaining crops, presented in Table 1.9 It is reassuring
for our choice of specification that the estimate of α is statistically not distinguishable from
one with high levels of confidence, as theory would suggest.
Having obtained a measure of the share of labor in the production of these 7 crops,
under the assumptions previously laid out, we proceed to construct our main variable of
interest, an index of potential labor intensity. We use data on agroclimatic suitability for
each crop from FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database (Fischer et al., 2002)10 and
combine them with the estimated labor shares in an index of the form
Potential labor intensityr =∑
i
βi
suitabilityir
∑j suitabilityjr
where r indexes regions and i indexes crops. The index for each region is a weighted
average of the relative suitabilities for different crops, where the weights are the crops’ labor
intensities. We normalize this to take on values from 0 to 100. The intuition behind it is
that labor intensity will more likely be higher in a region that is relatively more suitable
for more labor intensive crops. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of potential labor intensity
across European regions. There is significant variation both across and within countries.
In the following section, we will investigate whether this measure predicts preferences for
work in Europe today.
4 Main Empirical Results
Before examining whether potential labor intensity is correlated with contemporary work
ethics, it would be desirable to show that the intermediate link between labor intensity
and attitudes, namely hours worked in the past in societies dependent on agriculture, also
9We choose 0.4 for the labor intensity of wheat production, following Clark (2002) and Allen (2005), who
both estimate a value close to 0.4 for labor’s share of income in wheat, using historical data from England. The
estimates of relative labor intensities do not depend on the specific value chosen for this normalization.
10The database reports the suitability of each 5 by 5 arc-minute grid cell globally for the cultivation of
different crops. The model used to compute it considers each crop’s technical production requirements and
their interaction with each location’s land and agroclimatic resources and constraints. In the empirical analysis
we will directly control for the most important factors that affect suitability of a location for any given crop,
such as temperature, precipitation, slope and elevation, as well as for overall suitability for rainfed agriculture.
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holds. Unfortunately, work time is a variable that is rarely recorded in official statistics
and for which only fragmentary estimates exist for pre-industrial times (Voth, 1998). Some
early country-level estimates of hours worked come from Huberman and Minns (2007), who
report average weekly work hours in 1870 for a number of European and North American
countries. Though these do not refer specifically to agricultural labor, Figure 2 shows that
they are positively correlated with potential labor intensity at the country level. Despite
the small number of observations, the positive correlation lends credit to our hypothesis,
particularly because it is documented for a time period when no welfare regulation or
restrictions on work time were yet in place in most developed nations.
For our main analysis, we use data from all seven waves of the European Social Survey,
which is conducted every two years, from 2002 to 2014. The ESS collects individual-level
information on a number of background characteristics, social attitudes and human values.
We rely on two main outcome variables: the total number of hours respondents report nor-
mally working per week in their main job and the difference computed between weekly
hours contracted and weekly hours normally worked. The survey also asks individuals to
report the number of hours they would ideally choose to work weekly. The question is
phrased “How many hours a week, if any, would you choose to work, bearing in mind that
your earnings would go up or down according to how many hours you work?”. This ques-
tion directly captures the tradeoff between consumption and leisure that features centrally
in our theoretical framework, and we use it as an additional measure of work ethic. Table
2 reports summary statistics for these measures and for the rest of the variables included
in the empirical analysis. Figure 3 shows that there is a positive correlation between the
regional averages of these three variables and potential labor intensity.
Our main specification is
Yirc = α+ βPotential labor intensityrc + Xircγ1 + Zrcγ2 + θc + eirc
where Yirc is the outcome variable for individual i living in region r of country c, Xirc is
a vector of individual controls, Zrc a vector of regional geographic and economic controls
and θc is a country fixed effect. We focus throughout on individuals aged 25 to 60 — the
youngest retirement age in our sample — and, when examining actual work hours, we
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further restrict the sample to those who have a paid job at the time of the survey.
In columns (1), (5) and (9) of Table 3 we report our baseline estimates of the effect of
potential labor intensity on actual hours, overtime and desired weekly work hours respec-
tively, controlling only for a parsimonious set of individual characteristics (gender and age
dummies), that are unlikely to have been influenced by labor intensity, and indicators for
the ESS survey wave. The effect is significantly positive for all measures.
Since potential labor intensity is a measure constructed on the basis of relative suit-
abilities for different crops, there is a concern that it captures some of the geographic and
climatic factors that determine these suitabilities. To address this concern we control in
columns (2), (6) and (10) for a number of potentially important geographic and climatic
variables. Temperature, precipitation, the slope of the terrain and elevation, are all deter-
minants of crop suitability considered in the FAO models. We control for these variables,
as well as for latitude and longitude, to capture other spatial patterns that potentially af-
fect work ethics, but are not related to labor intensity. Including these controls reduces
somewhat the magnitude of the estimates on worked hours and overtime, but increases the
estimated effect on desired weekly hours. We also control for a measure of land suitability
for rainfed agriculture from FAO. Land suitability is highly (negatively) correlated with po-
tential labor intensity, as can be seen in Table B.1 in the Appendix, but it is a measure that
captures land productivity rather than returns to labor, and thus it is encouraging that our
estimate survives its inclusion.
Country fixed effects capture factors affecting attitudes towards work that differ at the
country level, such as labor laws and collective agreements, unemployment and welfare
provision, as well as GDP, a variable strongly negatively correlated with the number of
actual worked hours at the country level. In columns (3), (7) and (11), we additionally con-
trol for the log of regional income and regional unemployment, both measured in 2007.11
Regional GDP per capita shows a large positive correlation with hours worked and over-
time, but its inclusion does not substantially change the estimated effect of potential labor
intensity.
11Data for these variables come from the ESS and the chosen years are the ones for which we have the fewest
missing values.
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Weber’s treaty on Protestantism and the concept of work as a calling introduced the
influential idea that Protestantism (and in particular Calvinism and other reformed de-
nominations) fundamentally influenced the development of a work ethic. Spenkuch (2011)
finds support for this connection using microdata from Germany. Religious affiliation is
a potentially endogenous control, but, given the prominence of Protestantism among the-
ories explaining the work ethic, we are still interested in whether it makes the effect of
potential labor intensity disappear. Columns (4), (8) and (12) include in the regression
eight dummies for religion. Few of them (Jewish, Orthodox Christian, other non-Christian
and non-religious) are positively and significantly correlated with desired weekly work
hours and only Islam is significantly (negatively) correlated with actual hours worked and
weekly overtime. In fact, for these latter two outcomes, the correlation with Protestantism
is negative. More importantly, inclusion of these controls does not significantly affect the
magnitude of our estimate, which, in the case of desired weekly work hours even increases.
Overall, the estimated effect of one standard deviation increase in potential labor inten-
sity ranges between 14.5 and 24 minutes per week for actual work hours, between 12 to 15
minutes for weekly overtime and between 12 and 20 minutes per week for desired work
hours. Though not very large, this effect is remarkably consistent across specifications and
is of both statistical and of economic significance. Interestingly, few of the other included
controls are consistently significant and most — with the exception of latitude and land
suitability, which are both positively correlated with weekly work hours — are of negligible
magnitude.
5 Robustness
We begin assessing robustness by considering an alternative measure of the preference for
work, using a different dataset. The European Values Study (EVS) asks interviewed subjects
“Please say how important is work in your life”. Answers take on one of four values: 1
“Very important” 2 “Quite important” 3 “Not important” 4 “Not at all important”. We
use information from 4 waves of EVS (1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010) and
recode the variable so that higher numbers are associated with a higher work ethic. Table 4
reports specifications identical to those in Table 3 using this measure as dependent variable.
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The estimated effect is consistently positive and significant at the 5% level, and remains
virtually unchanged after inclusion of geographic, economic or religious controls. None of
the geographic controls has a significant effect on the measure of importance of work, and
the effect of potential labor intensity on the outcome is of a similar order of magnitude as
that of the regional unemployment rate.
A potential concern with our baseline measure of potential labor intensity is that the
Prussian data used to compute it are not representative of optimal factor allocations to
different crops. Furthermore, we use only one year of data, 1886, and though our esti-
mation amounts to computing the average labor share across Prussian counties and thus
removes some idiosyncratic variation, it is still possible that 1886 was a special year for
Prussia in terms of average yields or crop prices. More generally, it would be desirable to
check whether our ranking of crops in terms of labor intensity holds when computed with
different data.
To address these concerns, we turn to the US Census of Agriculture, which provides
information on crop yields by unit of land at the county level, from 1880 onwards. We use
three census years, 1880, 1890 and 1900 and repeat the estimation of labor shares for each
crop described in Section 3, this time including census-year fixed effects. This alternative
measure is not perfect: the US Census does not list information for all crops available in
the Prussian one, but only for potato, wheat, rye, oats and barley. There is also the concern
that US agriculture in the period 1880-1900 was more mechanized than that of Prussia in
1886, so that capital might play a bigger role in the production of some crops and confound
our results. Nevertheless, the US data yield a very similar ranking of crops as the Prussian
ones. With the exception of barley, that is now more labor intensive than all other three
cereals, the remaining crops retain their ranking. What is important, the potato is again
significantly more labor intensive than cereals.
We use the US-based estimates of crop-specific labor intensity to recompute our measure
of potential labor intensity at the regional level in Europe. Repeating the baseline estimation
with the new measure yields coefficients that are both qualitatively similar and surprisingly
close in magnitude to the baseline estimates. Column (1) of Table 5 shows that a standard
deviation increase in potential labor intensity increases the number of weekly work hours
by approximately 32 minutes (14.5 minutes in baseline). This effect is 15 minutes for weekly
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overtime and 23 minutes for desired weekly work hours.
An additional advantage of using US data is that we can directly compare the resulting
ranking of crops to estimates of crop-specific labor requirements from available agronomic
studies. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (1922) reports man-hours per acre of land for
various field crops and regions in the US. It finds the highest labor requirement for pota-
toes, followed by beans and corn. Oats, barley and wheat require a very similar, generally
low, number of average man-hours; the ordering in terms of labor intensity is practically
identical to that produced by our estimation using the US Census of Agriculture, with the
exception of rye which is reported to be slightly more labor intensive than wheat.12
To make this comparison more systematic, we construct a new estimate of crop-specific
labor intensity using the data on man hours per acre from the US Department of Agri-
culture. We make use of the fact that in an optimal allocation, labor to land ratios are
proportional to labor intensity, since for a crop i and under the assumptions outlined in
section 3, optimality requires hi/Ti = βi/(1− βi) ∗ (r/w). Potential labor intensity based
on these new crop-specific estimates significantly predicts all three work-related outcome
variables, as can be seen in columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 5. Notwithstanding the very
different estimation method, coefficients are of similar size as in our baseline estimation,
implying an increase of approximately 17 minutes in weekly work hours (13 for overtime
and 25 for desired weekly hours) in response to one standard deviation increase in potential
labor intensity.
Our ranking of crops by labor share indicates that, with wheat as the numeraire, cere-
als and pea are crops of low labor intensity, while the potato and the bean are more labor
intensive. These latter two are also crops that were introduced in Europe from the New
World. The potato arrived in the 16th century and saw widespread diffusion after 1800.
While there existed varieties of bean native to Europe, the most common field bean of the
Phaseolus genus was brought to the Old World during the Columbian exchange. Our con-
ceptual framework is silent on the length of time required for the formation of a preference
for work, and could allow for a recent crop of major significance like the potato (Nunn
12A practically identical ranking is provided by Cooper (1916) for the period 1902-1912.
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and Qian, 2011) to impact relative factor allocations and parental investment decisions rel-
atively quickly. Our results are, however, not solely driven by labor intensive New World
crops. When we recompute our measure of potential labor intensity by dropping the potato
and the bean, we get estimates of somewhat larger magnitude for weekly work hours and
desired weekly hours and identical for weekly overtime (Columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table
5).
What other individual characteristics, preferences or beliefs are affected by agricultural
labor intensity? We estimate our preferred specification, which includes geographic and
economic (but not religious) controls (Column (3) of Table 3) using as outcomes a number
of ESS variables capturing individual attitudes and human values. In Figure 4 we report
estimates of the coefficient on potential labor intensity, with p-values adjusted for the false
discovery rate within groups of different outcomes (q-values). Potential labor intensity does
not have a significant impact on any of the outcomes that are unrelated to work. It continues
having a positive and significant effect on weekly work hours and weekly overtime. The
coefficient on desired work hours does not survive the correction for multiple comparisons,
but remains positive and large compared to estimates for other outcomes. Taken together,
these results support a work ethic-specific effect of potential labor intensity and increase
our confidence in our baseline findings.
6 Persistence and cultural transmission
Cultural transmission is an important part of our story. Part of the work ethic is transmit-
ted from parents to children and this vertical socialization mechanism is important both in
the past, when returns to labor in agriculture determined optimal effort, but also poten-
tially today, when work attitudes persist because of interaction with institutions or similar
mechanisms. This suggests that our baseline estimates should become more precise if we
remove from the sample immigrants, whose place of origin has potentially very different
labor intensity from that of the region in which they currently live. We do this in Table 6.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) report our baseline regression with individual and regional con-
trols. Columns (2), (4) and (6) restrict the sample to native-born individuals, whose parents
are also native-born. Restricting the sample leads to a larger — and, in the case of desired
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hours, more precise — estimated effect of potential labor intensity.
To further assess the role of cultural transmission, we look at the children of immigrants
in the US (Ferna´ndez and Fogli, 2006, 2009). Our measure of potential labor intensity is
computed with European data and ignores a large number of crops that have for centuries
constituted important staples for many societies outside of Europe, such as rice or corn. For
this reason, we restrict our analysis to individuals whose parents migrated to the US from
Europe. We use ten years of information (2002-2012) from the Current Population Survey
and estimate the effect of potential labor intensity in the parental country on average weekly
hours worked in the main and secondary occupation for a sample of employed second
generation immigrants aged 25 to 65, the youngest age of retirement in the sample.
Columns (7)-(9) of Table 6 report the results. We consider the origin country of both
father and mother, both separately and jointly. We include the same set of controls for the
CPS sample as we do for the ESS survey, additionally controlling for survey year and state
of residence indicators. GDP per capita and unemployment are computed for the country
of the parent’s origin. As is often the case in studies of transmission, the estimated effect
of the mother’s country is larger than that of the father, and the largest effect is found in
the sample with parents from the same country of origin. An increase of one standard
deviation in the potential labor intensity increases weekly work time by up to an hour and
twenty-eight minutes, a large and significant effect.
7 Discussion
In this section, we address a number of remaining issues regarding our empirical strategy.
An important one among them is the presence of capital and the differential possibility
of mechanization across crops. In practice, our estimation backs out the share of labor
through a crop fixed effect, which is taken to proxy for the share of labor in the total
value of production after the contribution of land has been controlled for. This will be a
good proxy for the labor share if crop-specific capital inputs matter relatively little. This is
not very unlikely in the context of traditional agriculture, as it was practiced for centuries
in Europe, before the introduction of mechanization and agronomic improvements. In
the context of modern agriculture, crop-specific capital usage will be more relevant, but
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not necessarily problematic for our estimates. Since mechanization has been a far more
important labor-saving factor for land-intensive cereals than for labor-intensive tubers such
as the potato (Knowlton, Elwood and McKibben, 1938; Elwood et al., 1939), it is likely that,
by abstracting from capital, we overestimate the labor intensity of cereals and thus compress
the true difference in labor intensity between them and the potato. Controlling for capital
would show e.g. wheat to be even less labor-intensive than we now find it to be. In any
case, it is reassuring that at least our ordering of crops in terms of labor intensity seems to
be confirmed by existing estimates of labor requirements, expressed as man-hours per unit
of land.
In the same way that crop-specific capital inputs might bias our labor share estimates,
any crop-specific unobserved factor will have a similar effect. Volatility and risk, to the
extent that they are more important for some crops than for others, are an example of such
a factor. Furthermore, we would expect the effect of labor intensity on the work ethic to
be affected not just by the crop-specific, but also by the overall volatility of production.
Returns to labor are lower when farmers are more uncertain of their total output, and so is
the incentive to invest in a preference for work. Studies of peasant culture suggest indeed
that fatalism and the belief that no amount of hard work can improve the peasants’ situation
decrease significantly when production becomes more predictable, for example through the
introduction of irrigation that reduces dependence on rainfall (Arkush, 1984; Ortiz, 1971).
We do not explicitly deal with historical variation in forms of ownership structure and
farm labor relationships, such as feudal serfdom or slavery. To the extent that farmers
under serfdom are forced to work longer hours than they would otherwise optimally choose
for themselves, without benefiting from the extra consumption, the incentive of parents to
transmit a work ethic to their children will be lowered. On the other hand, longer demanded
work hours offer parents a direct incentive for making their children hard-working and
reducing their future disutility, so that the total effect of serfdom or slavery on work ethics
will be ambiguous. In any case, regional differences in labor intensity within serfdom
should still lead to differences in work attitudes. Labor intensive crops demand a higher
labor input, even if that is chosen by the feudal lord and not the serf himself. If the nature of
production forces children of serfs to work hard, then a higher work ethic will be beneficial
for them.
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Our theoretical framework was simple and used to demonstrate how the formation of a
work ethic depends on the equilibrium labor share in an agricultural economy. We have not
investigated theoretically how the work ethic persists once agriculture stops being the most
important economic activity. One way in which this persistence can be explained is through
the interaction of the work ethic with institutions, such as redistribution. If redistributive
policies are chosen through majority voting, a society with high work norms will be more
likely to choose low tax rates; individuals will then rely more on their own labor than on
welfare, thus having an incentive to maintain a high work ethic. Such models of multiple
steady states, in which institutions interact with work culture have been proposed by Bisin
and Verdier (2004), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006).
8 Conclusion
This paper shows how a high work ethic, in the sense of a lower preference for leisure,
arises and persists in societies with high labor returns in agricultural production. We show
this relation holds theoretically when preferences can evolve endogenously as a result of
parental socialization. We then quantify the relative labor input required in different crops
using production data from 19th century Prussia and combine this information with agri-
cultural suitability in an index of potential labor intensity. This measure of potential labor
intensity positively correlates with various proxies of a work ethic. Individuals from Eu-
ropean regions that are relatively more suitable for labor intensive crops work more hours
per week, report a higher number of desired weekly work hours and consider work more
important in their lives, controlling for country fixed effects, individual factors and regional
economic and geographic characteristics. This effect is generally stronger for individuals
native to their region of residence. US natives with European-born parents also work more
hours when their parents come from countries with a higher potential labor intensity, a
result that offers support to a cultural transmission mechanism.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Potential labor intensity in the regions of Europe
Figure 2: Potential labor intensity and historical work hours
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Figure 3: Correlation of potential labor intensity and work-related outcomes at the regional
level
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Figure 4: Labor intensity and other ESS attitudes
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Notes: The figure plots the estimated effect of potential labor intensity on attitudes and human values reported
in the ESS survey. All regressions include the full set of controls from column (3) of Table 3. Horizontal lines
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adjusted for false discovery rate (q-values) in parentheses. Bold text indicates coefficients with q-value<0.10.
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Table 1: Estimates of crop-specific labor shares from Prussian agricultural data
Barley Rye Pea Oat Wheat Potato Bean
Labor share 0.079 0.149 0.299 0.370 0.400 0.571 0.601
Labor shares are computed as 1− e−δi , where δi is the crop-specific fixed effect in a regression of the log value
of output on county and crop indicators and the log of county land allocated to the production of crop i. Land
and output data are from the 1886 Prussian agricultural census and price data are from the Prussian statistical
office. For more details on the calculation of labor shares see Section 3.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Weekly work hours 40.55 13.01 0 140 145594
Weekly overtime 3.066 8.574 -130 140 141430
Desired weekly work hours 35.87 13.35 0 140 48038
Potential labor intensity 72.48 14.07 0 100 148422
Potential labor intensity (US) 49.65 16.18 0 100 148422
Potential labor intensity (Old World crops) 64.47 14.40 0 100 148422
Potential labor intensity (man hours per acre) 70.70 14.01 0 100 148422
Individual controls
Female 0.525 0.499 0 1 149445
Age 42.95 10.10 25 60 149503
Catholic 0.312 0.463 0 1 143725
Protestant 0.123 0.329 0 1 143725
Orthodox 0.0703 0.256 0 1 143725
Jewish 0.000835 0.0289 0 1 143725
Muslim 0.0282 0.166 0 1 143725
Other Christian 0.0149 0.121 0 1 143725
Other non-Christian 0.00413 0.0642 0 1 143725
Non religious 0.432 0.495 0 1 147432
Geographic controls
Temperature 8.696 3.429 -1.740 18.45 149503
Precipitation 803.8 263.1 275.8 1739.6 149503
Terrain slope index 7470.3 1912.1 1236.9 9953.9 149503
Elevation 308.9 321.5 0 2073.6 149503
Latitude 50.27 6.622 28.34 68.85 149503
Longitude 11.19 10.64 -21.67 41.81 149503
Land suitability 4.326 1.438 1.260 8.010 149503
Economic controls
Log GDP per capita 2007 9.991 0.718 7.650 11.26 149503
Unemployment rate 2007 6.425 3.172 1.900 18.20 149503
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Table 4: Labor intensity and importance of work, EVS data
Dep. variable How important is work in your life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential labor intensity 0.00154∗∗∗ 0.00154∗∗ 0.00142∗∗ 0.00134∗∗ 0.00122∗∗
(0.000587) (0.000597) (0.000632) (0.000600) (0.000593)
Land suitability 0.000204 -0.000704 -0.00196 -0.00197
(0.00453) (0.00613) (0.00529) (0.00529)
Temperature -0.0194 -0.0155 -0.0152
(0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0116)
Precipitation -0.0000382 -0.0000143 -0.0000191
(0.0000339) (0.0000306) (0.0000304)
Slope -0.00000109 0.00000518 0.00000507
(0.00000592) (0.00000537) (0.00000537)
Elevation -0.0000760 -0.0000237 -0.0000263
(0.0000601) (0.0000591) (0.0000595)
Latitude -0.00548 -0.00109 -0.000299
(0.00799) (0.00739) (0.00754)
Longitude 0.00210 -0.00134 -0.00147
(0.00262) (0.00245) (0.00251)
Regional GDP p.c. -0.0552∗∗∗ -0.0518∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0165)
Regional 0.00928∗∗∗ 0.00981∗∗∗
unemployment rate (0.00218) (0.00222)
Observations 58165 58165 58165 58165 58165
R-squared 0.0425 0.0425 0.0429 0.0447 0.0468
Religion dummies N N N N Y
The sample consists of individuals aged 25-60. All regressions include country fixed effects, indicators for
gender and age and EVS survey wave dummies. Column (5) includes dummies for the following groups:
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, Orthodox Christian, Hindu, Other, non-religious. Standard errors are
clustered at the NUTS region level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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A Appendix: Model Extensions
A.1 Work ethics and fertility choice
To investigate how population growth affects the results of our baseline model, we intro-
duce an endogenous fertility choice following the literature on Malthusian growth (see for
example Barro and Becker (1989)). The number of children is denoted by n, and they can
be raised at a cost θ(n), θn > 0, θnn ≤ 0, paid in consumption goods. The family holding of
land is denoted with t and is distributed equally among children. Finally, N, H = hN and
T = tN denote total population, aggregate labor and land supply, respectively.
A representative parent solves the program
V(γ, t; N = max
c,h,n,I
{
log(c)− 1
γ
h1+φ
1 + φ
− nI + a(n)V(γ′, t′; N′)
}
s.t.
c = wh+ rTt− θ(n)
γ′ = ργ+Ψ(I)
t′ =
t
n
The first order and envelope conditions of this problem are
w
c
=
1
γ
hφ
n = a(n)V ′γΨI
θn
c
+ I = anV ′ − a(n)V ′t
t
n2
Vγ =
1
γ2
h1+φ
1 + φ
+ a(n)V ′γρ
Vt =
rT
c
+ a(n)V ′t
1
n
36
which together with the aggregate conditions
H = hN
T = tN
Y = AT1−βHβ
w = β
Y
H
rT = (1− β)YT
c =
Y
N
− θ(n)
N′ = nN
define the equilibrium outcome. Notice that similar to the baseline model, the first order
condition for labor, together with the wage equation and the resource constraint, implies
that all else equal, a high labor intensity β will induce a higher equilibrium labor supply.
In the steady state with zero population growth, we have n = 1 and the dynamic equa-
tions hence become
γ =
Ψ(I)
1− ρ (10)
Vγ =
(
1
1− a(1)ρ
)
1
γ2
h1+φ
1 + φ
(11)
Vt =
1
1− a(1)
rT
c
(12)
θn(1)
c
+ I = an(1)V − a(1)Vtt (13)
1 = a(1)VγΨI (14)
w
c
=
1
γ
hφ (15)
While this model does not have a general analytical solution, we can analyze for illus-
tration purposes the special case in which θ(1) = 0, i.e. the theoretical case in which the
first child contributes as much to income as it costs. Under this assumption, labor supply
collapses to h = (βγ)
1
1+φ . Together with (10), (11) and (14), this implies that work ethics
behave exactly the same as in the basic model and are hence increasing in the labor intensity
of production.
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Figure A.1: Work ethics and population size
Notes: Steady state values as a function of β. Both series are normalized to equal one at β = 0.4.
Solving numerically for the steady state, we investigate a large region of parameter
values and functional form, and robustly find that the work ethics are a strictly increasing
function of labor intensity. Figure A.1 illustrates how work ethics and population size
depend on β, where the shown specification assumes a linear cost function of children
θ(n) = 0.4n. Interestingly, and the flip side of the result for work ethics, population is
decreasing in labor intensity. As a work ethic becomes more valuable with high β, parents
invest more in their offspring but reduce the quantity of children they have.
A.2 Work ethics in subsistence agriculture
In the theoretical results up to now, labor productivity had no effect on hours worked and
the development of work ethics, since the income and substitution effect of a productivity
increase cancel out. Instead, labor intensity was the sole determinant of attitudes towards
work.13 In this section, we briefly review the case of a subsistence agriculture by introducing
13An interesting example of this, within the context of a single crop, has been documented by Barker, Herdt
and Rose (1985). Due to differences in the geographic and technological structure across rice farms in selected
villages of Indonesia, Taiwan and the Philippines around 1970, the average labor productivity was lowest in
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a minimum consumption constraint into the basic model, and discuss how this affects the
role of productivity and labor intensity.
Consider again the basic model, extended with a minimum consumption requirement
c ≥ c. We define a subsistence economy as an economy in which the hours optimally
worked in the steady state of the unconstrained model are not sufficient to satisfy the
minimum consumption requirement, i.e. AT1−βhβss < c, hss = (βγss)
1
1+φ . In this case, the
equilibrium labor supply is given by
h =
1
T
( c
AT
) 1
β
(16)
Hours worked now depend negatively on the aggregate productivity A. If productivity is
low in a subsistence economy, individuals will need to work more. By the same logic as
discussed in the previous section, this increases the return to having a high work ethic and
hence to parental investment. It follows that low productivity leads to a high steady state
work ethic.
The effect of labor intensity is now ambiguous. Notice that β only has a positive effect
on hours worked if the term in brackets of (16) is less then one, i.e. AT > c. This result
is similar to the one in Vollrath (2011), and indicates that in subsistence agriculture, labor
intensity only has a positive effect on hours and hence on work ethics once productivity is
already sufficiently developed. Finally notice that the minimum consumption requirement
can lead to a multiplicity of steady states when β is sufficiently high, with one steady-
state in the constrained region with low work ethics and one in the unconstrained region
with high work ethics. This results from the fact that work ethics endogenously determine
whether the consumption constraint is binding or not. We leave a deeper investigation of
this topic, as well as potential interactions with an endogenous fertility choice, for further
research.
Indonesia, followed by the Philippines and Taiwan. The authors estimate however that, for a given amount of
labor input, the marginal product is higher in Indonesia and Taiwan than it is in the Philippines. They then use
village level data to show that rice farmers work significantly less hours in the Philippines than in the other two
regions. Returns to labor seemed to dominate labor productivity as a determinant of effort, as in the baseline
version of our model.
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B Additional Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Suitability, planted area and yields in Prussian counties
(a) Suitability and average yield per acre
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(b) Suitability and share of total acres planted
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Notes: The figure plots the correlation between average crop-specific suitability (y-axis) and average crop-
specific yield per acre (upper panel) or share of total county acres planted with the crop (lower panel) in
Prussian counties. Data is from the 1886 Prussian agricultural census.
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